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Introduction and summary
A key mission of the U.S. Federal Reserve System
is to safeguard the economy against systemic finan-
cial crises. This concern with financial crises stems
from a long-held belief that they are associated with
declines in economic activity. In the U.S., there is
clear evidence that financial panics and recessions
are somehow related (Mishkin, 1991). In the case of
the Great Depression, Bernanke (1983) argues that
the disruption in financial intermediation transformed
a severe downturn into a protracted depression.
More recently, the Asian financial crisis in 1997 was
followed by sharp declines in economic activity.
(Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia all expe-
rienced two-quarter declines in gross domestic prod-
uct [GDP] of over 12 percent.) This historical record
has led to a pervasive belief that systemic crises in
the financial sector have consequences that are far
more than sectoral. Rather, they appear to affect the
entire economy, perhaps through the unique role
played by financial intermediation.
The most recent financial crisis in the U.S. oc-
curred in late summer and fall of 1998. On August
17, the Russian government devalued the rouble, de-
faulted on its rouble-denominated debt, and imposed
a moratorium on payments to foreign creditors of
Russian financial institutions. Following these actions,
asset values fell precipitously in all Group of Seven
(G-7) countries, and there is evidence of widespread
withdrawal of liquidity from financial markets. Par-
ticularly dramatic was the near collapse and eleventh-
hour recapitalization in late September of Long-Term
Capital Management (LTCM), a large hedge fund.
From a U.S. perspective, these events might be
described as an incipient crisis, because there is
little evidence of damage to western economies. Ar-
guably, this is because of the decisive action by the
Federal Reserve in cutting the target federal funds
rate in three successive 25 basis-point moves. The
second of these moves, on October 15, was particu-
larly noteworthy, since it occurred between regularly
scheduled meetings of the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC). Intermeeting rate cuts of this
type are rare; the October 15 action was the first such
action since April 1994. In the next section, I provide
evidence that the end of this incipient crisis coincid-
ed almost exactly with the October 15 rate cut. In
particular, credit spreads abruptly narrowed on Octo-
ber 16 (one day after the Federal Reserve move), and
stock markets in all G-7 countries started to recover a
week to ten days prior to the October 15 move. (That
stock markets anticipated the rate cut is no surprise.
For at least a week prior to the move the financial press
reported rumors of a possible intermeeting rate cut.)
The way this incipient crisis ended is somewhat
puzzling. The crisis had a clear trigger: the Russian
default and devaluation in mid-August. Western finan-
cial institutions were directly affected by the default
if they held Russian liabilities. Furthermore, the
Russian default may have signaled higher default
risk for sovereign debt from other emerging or transi-
tion economies. So it is not surprising that uncertainty
grew about institutions solvency (with attendant in-
creases in asset price volatility and credit spreads).
What is puzzling is the way the crisis appears to have
abated with the Feds second rate cut. Why would the
problems (both direct and informational) associated
with the Russian default be reduced by a mere 50
basis-point cumulative cut in the overnight interest3 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
rate? If the crisis was associated with higher default
risk of emerging-economy debt, why would the Feds
rate cut have dramatically reduced this default risk?
Similarly, if the crisis was associated with an increased
informational asymmetry among financial institutions,
why would the 50 basis-point cut in the federal funds
rate have reduced this asymmetry?
In this article, I argue that the crisis can be char-
acterized as an episode of potential coordination fail-
ure, triggered bybut ultimately distinct fromthe
events in Russia. I propose a simple model of finan-
cial crises as coordination failure. The model qualita-
tively matches the following features typically
associated with financial crises:
1. Abrupt shifts between a state of adequate liquidi-
ty provision and a state of aggregate illiquidity
(the latter being a case where institutions with
liquidity refuse to lend to those needing liquidity);
2. A flight to quality, whereby institutions with
funds to invest preferentially choose a low-risk,
low-return asset;
3. Fear among lenders that credit quality among
potential borrowers has deteriorated;
4. Real costs in economic output;
5. Sudden declines in asset values; and
6. A role for the central banks open market operations
in containing the crisis.
In particular, the model provides one potential
explanation for why the Federal Reserve action on
October 15, 1998, eliminated the danger of a full-blown
crisis. This model contributes to the growing literature
developing formal models of financial crises and finan-
cial fragility. Notable examples of these include Chang
and Velasco (1998), Louganoff and Schreft (1998),
DenHaan, Ramey, and Watson (1999), and Chari and
Kehoe (1998, 2000).
Coordination failure can emerge in any economy
where the profitability of a given agents investment
depends on the decisions of the other agents in the
economy. In the model of this article, the possibility
of coordination failure arises from the essential func-
tion of financial markets: to match potential users of
capital (borrowers) with potential providers of capital
(lenders) in an environment of asymmetric information.
Borrowers and lenders match via a search procedure.
In this model, multiple equilibria are possible. A high-
coordination equilibrium can occur in which all
lenders and all borrowers enter the match, maximiz-
ing the expected output of the economy. However,
there are times when a low-coordination equilibrium
is possible in which all good quality (that is, highly
creditworthy) borrowers refrain from entering the
match. Knowing that only poor quality borrowers seek
loans, potential lenders refuse to lend. I identify this
low-coordination equilibrium with a financial crisis.
In the model, the low-coordination equilibrium
cannot exist if the risk-free real interest rate is suffi-
ciently low. This suggests a potential role for the cen-
tral bank. If monetary policy can affect real interest
rates, the central bank can extinguish the low-coordi-
nation equilibrium if it reduces the real interest rate
sufficiently via an aggressive monetary expansion.
That the Federal Reserve has the power to do so is
suggested by the events of 199193. As I discuss in a
later section, there is evidence that banks cut back on
lending activity in the early 1990s. Following a shift
to a more expansionary monetary policy in mid-1991,
in which the real federal funds rate fell from 2.5 per-
cent to 0.5 percent, lending activity moved back to
normal levels.
Unlike the Federal Reserve action of 199193,
the monetary expansion in fall 1998 was too small,
and the consequent effect on real interest rates too
marginal, to have a substantial direct effect on lender
incentives. Rather, I interpret the intermeeting rate
cut of October 15 as a signal that the Federal Reserves
policy rule had changed. Before the intermeeting move,
market participants were uncertain whether the Federal
Reserve would compromise its focus on price stability
(and the associated tight money policy) even in the
face of severe financial market strains. I argue that
the intermeeting move was interpreted by market
participants as signaling a shift to a state-contingent
policy: focus on price stability unless a financial crisis
becomes imminent; temporarily abandon that focus
if the threat of financial crisis becomes severe. In this
article, I formally model such a policy, and I show
that, in principle, such a policy can extinguish the low-
coordination equilibrium. Furthermore, if this policy
is credible, it never has to be implemented: The policy
itself removes the possibility of coordination failure.
That is, monetary expansion is an off-equilibrium
path that enforces the high-coordination equilibrium.
Below, I review the facts of the crisis of fall 1998,
highlighting key features that I will seek to replicate
in the theoretical model. Then, I describe the basic
coordination failure model. Finally, I show how the
central bank can avert coordination failure by imple-
menting an appropriate and credible state-contingent
monetary policy.
Brief review of the events of fall 1998
Here, I review the crisis and provide evidence
for the following assertions:4 Economic Perspectives
1. The crisis was associated with large declines in
equity values, increased volatility in financial
markets, widening credit spreads, and an increased
demand for U.S. Treasury securities.
2. During the crisis, there was a reduction in available
liquidity, as institutions with loanable funds reduced
the volume of funds available to the market.
3. The crisis rapidly abated following the Federal
Reserves intermeeting cut in the federal funds
rate on October 15, 1998.
Financial markets showed evidence of potential
problems starting around mid-July 1998. However,
the onset of the crisis is usually associated with the
Russian devaluation and default in August 1998. This
denouement was in large part forced by declining
hard currency inflows over the preceding several
months as oil prices fell. On August 17, Russia de-
faulted on its rouble-denominated public debt. At
that time, this stock of debt represented $61 billion,
17 percent of Russian GDP. At the same time, Russia
declared a 90-day moratorium on all foreign obliga-
tions of Russian financial institutions. Finally, the rou-
ble exchange rate zone was substantially widened,
amounting to a de facto devaluation of 25 percent.
The exchange rate zone was completely abandoned
ten days later.1 As I discuss below, western financial
markets reacted negatively to these developments. In
response, the FOMC cut the federal funds rate by 25
basis points at its next regular meeting on September
29. This move by the Federal Reserve did not calm
the financial markets.2 On October 15, in an unusual
intermeeting move, the FOMC made an additional
25 basis-point rate cut. Observers point to this inter-
meeting move as marking the end of the crisis.
The data in figure 1 characterize more fully the
impact of these events on western financial markets.
As shown in figure 1, panel A, the U.S. S&P 500 in-
dex peaks in mid-July 1998, with a small local peak
in mid-August 1998 (vertical dashed line) following
the Russian default. Thereafter, there is a sharp de-
cline in stock values, amounting to more than 18 per-
cent over the three months from peak to trough. The
S&P 500 index bottomed out on October 8, one week
before the FOMCs intermeeting rate cut on October
15 (vertical solid line). The biggest close-to-close
rise of this period was from October 14 to October
15. It is no surprise that the market trough occurred
one week before the Fed intermeeting action, since
there was speculation prior to the Feds action that an
intermeeting rate cut was likely.3 The behavior of the
federal funds futures market supports this interpreta-
tion. Through October 7, futures prices implied an
expected federal funds rate through the end of October
of 5.22 percent to 5.24 percent, implying little proba-
bility of a rate cut. On October 8, this expected federal
funds rate dropped to 5.18 percent, which is consistent
with a 50 percent probability of a quarter-point rate
cut around mid-October.4
The behavior of stock indexes for the other six
countries in the G-7 is roughly comparable to that
of the U.S. indexes. In all cases, the market peaks in
mid-July, falls steeply, and starts to turn up about one
week before the October 15 rate cut. The total market
declines over this three-month period were quite pro-
nounced, ranging from 18 percent in Japan to over 28
percent in Canada, Italy, and France.5
Figure 1, panel B displays the value of the Chi-
cago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) volatility in-
dex (a measure computed by the CBOE from implied
volatility on a number of option contracts).6 These
data show that uncertainty (and associated risk) in
financial markets rose steeply in mid-August 1998.
The date of the first pronounced jump was actually
August 27, when the closing value of this index rose
to 39.16 (compared with the previous days close of
30.66). This date corresponds to the Russian govern-
ments announcement that it was abandoning its trad-
ing band for the rouble. In trading during August 27,
the rouble fell 40 percent against the deutschemark.
In addition, on that date Deutsche Bank lost its AAA
rating from Standard and Poors when it revealed
that it had unsecured Russian credit risk amounting
to almost $750 million. For the next seven weeks the
volatility index stayed at a level that was unprece-
dented, except for the period around the 1987 stock
market crash. The index remained at or near 40 until
October 15 (the date of the intermeeting rate cut),7
when it fell to 35.95 (compared with the previous
days close of 41.31). Within two trading days the
index had fallen to around 30, remaining between
20 and 30 through the end of 1999.
Figure 1, panels C, D, and E display three U.S.
credit spreads: the interbank spread (three-month
interbank yield minus three-month T-bill yield), the
short-term credit spread (three-month commercial
paper yield minus three-month T-bill yield), and the
long-term credit spread (ten-year AAA corporate bond
yield minus ten-year T-bond yield). These credit
spreads confirm the inference from figure 1, panel B
that there was an abrupt increase in perceived credit
risk from mid-August to mid-October. In particular,
they show a pronounced spike starting in late Septem-
ber 1998 (around the time of the LTCM rescue) and
continuing until October 16, one day after the FOMCs
intermeeting rate cut. The peak in the long-term credit5 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
spread during this period is the highest in the 1990s,
and the peak in the other two credit spreads is only
exceeded during this decade by that observed during
the 199091 recession.8
There is evidence that the increase in perceived
credit risk was associated with a substantial drying-
up of liquidity. That is, institutions with loanable
funds became more reluctant to extend unsecured
loans. The Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Senior Loan Officers Survey in September9 revealed
a marked increase over the August survey in the
number of banks tightening loan standards and raising
loan rates. (See figure 2, panels A and B.) A principal
reason reported by banks for these actions was a
FIGURE 1
U.S. financial market indicators, March 1997June 1999
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Notes: The vertical dashed lines indicate August 17, 1997, the date of the Russian default. The vertical solid
lines indicate October 15, 1997, the date of the Federal Reserve’s intermeeting cut in the federal funds rate.
Panels C, D, and E display three U.S. credit spreads: the interbank spread (panel C) is the three-month
interbank yield minus three-month Treasury bill yield. The three-month default spread (panel D) is the three-
month commercial paper yield minus three-month Treasury bill yield. The ten-year default spread is the ten-year
AAA corporate bond yield minus ten-year Treasury bond yield.
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (panels A, C, D, E); Chicago Board Options
Exchange (panel B).6 Economic Perspectives
reduced tolerance for risk. Interestingly, there was a
substantial increase in the number of banks reporting
decreased loan demand. The respondents generally
attributed this reduced demand to reductions in both
merger and acquisition activity and fixed investment.
This suggests that the reduction in loan activity was
due to both a reduced willingness of lenders to bear
default risk and a reduced interest of borrowers in
expanding economic activity. While reports of tight-
ened loan standards continue through the November
survey, the reduction in loan demand appears to have
reversed by November.
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS, 1999)
surveyed a number of market participants about the
events of fall 1998. The survey results confirm the
perception that risk levels were elevated and liquidity
provision diminished in the period from mid-August
through mid-October 1998. They point to an unprec-
edented widening in bid/ask spreads and even to
one-sided markets, where sellers of risky securities
could not find a buyer at any price. On numerous
occasions, market makers in government securities
simply withdrew from trading and refrained from
posting quotes.10 The BIS interviewees report a flight
to the most liquid, on-the-run (that is, most recently
issued) Treasury securities. For example, by early
October, the yield spread between 28-year and 30-
year Treasury bonds had widened to 29 basis points
from just 7 basis points in mid-August (although the
28-year issues are just as free from default risk as the
30-year on-the-run bonds). Salomon Smith Barney
reported that this spread was the widest it had ever
recorded.11 Continued ability to trade Treasury secu-
rities in any desired quantity was assured only for the
on-the-run issues. The flight to quality even devolved,
for a brutal but short-lived period12 to a flight to
cash. A number of participants reported reductions in
credit lines to other financial institutions. This drying-
up of liquidity exacerbated price volatility and in-
creased credit risk associated with institutions that
relied on market funding. Interestingly, the infusion
of funds to LTCM, facilitated by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York in late September 1998,13 seemed
to exacerbate the liquidity crisis. Participants in the
BIS survey interpreted the Federal Reserves role as
a signal that the Federal Reserve believed that the
crisis was far worse than previously thought. Finally,
the BIS interviewees perceived the October 15 rate
cut as the turning point of the crisis. In its summary
of interviews with market participants, the BIS states,
The second monetary easing by the Federal Reserve
(15 October) signaled the beginning of the abatement
of financial strains. At that time, traders clearly under-
stood the commitment of the Federal Reserve to fix
the problems.
To summarize, the period from mid-August to
mid-October 1998 was characterized by rapid declines
in stock values, rapid increases in uncertainty, and a
reluctance of institutions with loanable funds to pro-
vide loans. The crisis appears to have abated in U.S.
financial markets with the Feds intermeeting rate cut
of October 15. In particular, the stock market recov-
ery, the narrowing of credit spreads in fixed income
markets, and the decline in the CBOE volatility index
all commenced around October 15. Other more qualita-
tive measures of the crisis, such as the Board of Gover-
nors Senior Loan Officers Survey, the BIS interviews
with market participants, and reports in the financial
press, are also consistent with this interpretation.
FIGURE 2
Measures of credit market tightness
B. Net percentage of banks increasing spreads













































A. Net percentage of banks tightening
standards for C&I loans
percent
Notes: This figure plots data from the Federal Reserve Board’s
Senior Loan Officers Surveys from January 1997 through January
2000. Responses to the January, March, August, and November
surveys report bank credit policies over the preceding three
months. The September 1998 survey reports bank credit policies
over the preceding month only.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
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What generated the crisis?
It is perhaps no surprise that the Russian default
and devaluation triggered turmoil in western finan-
cial markets. There was a good deal of uncertainty
about the direct exposure of western financial institu-
tions to the Russian default. Furthermore, western
investors may have interpreted the Russian default as
evidence against the creditworthiness of other emerg-
ing economies. Investors were particularly concerned
about Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, which are far
more important than Russia for U.S. trade.14 (In fact,
Brazil devalued its currency in mid-January 1999.)
Figure 3, which plots Brady bond yields,15 shows how
the Russian default triggered an increase in perceived
credit risk for these three Latin American countries
that eclipsed the increase following the 1997 Asian
crisis. In all three countries, the yields more than
doubled following the Russian default in mid-August
1998. (The yield spike for Brazil was particularly
pronounced.) However, this explanation for the crisis
does not fully account for the way it ended. It is hard
to imagine that the exposure of western institutions to
emerging and transitional economies or the informa-
tional asymmetry about these exposures would have
been reduced by a 50 basis-point reduction in the fed-
eral funds rate. Similarly, the creditworthiness of
borrowers in these economies would not have been
affected substantially by the Federal Reserves action.
Thus, while the Russian default clearly triggered the
financial crisis, the crisis appears to have taken on a
self-fulfilling aspect over and above the damage attrib-
utable to the actions of the Russian government.
Other financial crises have also involved sudden
shifts between crisis and non-crisis states without a
commensurate change in fundamentals. The Asian
crisis of 1997 provides an example, although in that
case the sudden shift occurred at the beginning of the
crisis. The Asian crisis was completely unforeseen by
financial markets. In particular, in none of the Asian
crisis countries do interest rates or forward exchange
rates move prior to the speculative attacks leading to
the initial Thai devaluation.16 Furthermore, the Asian
crisis was not triggered by any shock to fundamentals
commensurate with the magnitude of the subsequent
debacle. While there were clear problems with market
fundamentals in these countries (in particular, the
poor state of their banking sectors), these problems
were well known months or even years prior to the
crisis.17 It appears that any theory of systemic financial
crisis must incorporate the possibility of sudden, un-
triggered shifts between crisis and non-crisis states.
Modeling financial crisis as
coordination failure18
As described earlier, the financial crisis of fall
1998 had a number of characteristics that have been
associated with crises more generally. There was a
sudden shift between crisis and non-crisis states with-
out a commensurate change in fundamentals. The crisis
state was characterized by a sharp reduction in liquidi-
ty provision with a corresponding flight to quality.
The crisis was associated with a decline in asset val-
ues, as reflected in stock market indexes.19 In addi-
tion, the crisis of 1998 shows clear evidence of an
increase in perceived default risk. Final-
ly, the end of the 1998 crisis was associ-
ated with an unusual action by the central
bank (a change in the target federal funds
rate between regularly scheduled FOMC
meetings).
In this section, I propose a simple
model of financial crisis that, in principle,
can accommodate these patterns. My ap-
proach focuses on the possibility of coor-
dination failure. In coordination models,
an investor benefits if he chooses the same
strategy as other investors. Thus, investors
will tend to coordinate on a particular
strategy. A multiplicity of equilibria can
emerge, each associated with a different
pattern of coordination. Suboptimal equi-
libria are then associated with coordination
failure: the failure to coordinate on the
socially optimal choices. In a familiar
example, known as external increasing
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Note: This figure plots yields from dollar-denominated sovereign
debt (“Brady bonds”) issued by Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.
Source: Bloomberg.8 Economic Perspectives
returns to scale, the productivity of a particular firms
capital investment is high only if there is a high level
of aggregate economic activity. Therefore, a firm may
only want to choose a high level of investment if
enough other firms also choose a high level of invest-
ment (thereby assuring a high level of aggregate activ-
ity). If other firms choose low investment, aggregate
activity will be low, and an individual firms invest-
ment productivity may be too low to justify a high in-
vestment level. In this example, there are two equilibria:
one where all firms coordinate on high investment,
the other where all firms have low investment.20
In the model I present here, the possibility of co-
ordination failure arises from the essential nature of
financial relationshipsthe need to match potential
borrowers with potential lenders in an environment
of asymmetric information. In particular, lenders must
search for borrowers and vice versa. As the total num-
ber of borrowers and lenders rises, this search process
becomes more productive. That is, the rate at which
borrowers and lenders match goes up. In other words,
the matching process exhibits a thick markets externali-
ty: Everyone benefits as the number of participants in
the market rises.21
This thick markets externality gives rise to the
possibility of a coordination failure equilibrium: If
lenders believe that there are few high-quality bor-
rowers searching for loans, and simultaneously the
high-quality borrowers believe that there are few
lenders willing to extend credit, an equilibrium can
emerge where both lenders and borrowers forsake
the loan market in favor of alternative investments.
In effect, all parties have coordinated on nonpartic-
ipation, so the optimal strategy for any individual
agent is not to participate.
Basic structure of the model
The basic model is completely static. There are
two types of risk-neutral agents: borrowers (Nborr in
number), who are endowed with a project but no
liquidity; and lenders (Nlend in number), who are en-
dowed with one unit of liquidity but no project. A
borrower can operate his project in two mutually exclu-
sive ways: autarkically, without any liquidity inflow
from outside; or with investment, which requires bor-
rowing one unit of liquidity from a lender. A borrow-
er must decide at the beginning of the period whether
to operate the project autarkically or whether to seek
a loan. In other words, once the borrower has decided
to seek a loan, the possibility of autarkic production
is precluded.
Borrowers are randomly assigned one of two
types of projects, bad (assigned with probability pb),
and good (assigned with probability (1  pb)). The
quality of the project is private information to the
borrower. Good projects pay Rautarky with certainty if
operated autarkically; they pay R with certainty if
operated with investment, provided the borrower has
found a lender willing to lend. Bad projects pay 0 if
operated autarkically; if operated with investment,
bad projects pay R with probability q and Rsalvage with
probability (1  q), again provided borrower has
found a lender willing to lend. Informally, a bad bor-
rower defaults on his loan with probability (1  q);
Rsalvage represents the salvage value of the project that
is available to satisfy the lenders claim. Finally, if a
borrower seeks a loan but fails to match with a lender,
he receives zero.
An interpretation22 of these two types of borrowers
is that bad borrowers are in severe financial distress.
If they do not get an immediate liquidity infusion,
they will be forced into bankruptcy. Even if they do
receive liquidity, financial distress may impair their
productivity with probability (1  q). In contrast, good
borrowers can stay in operation without liquidity,
albeit at a lower output. However, there is an up-front
cost to structuring the project to utilize liquidity. My
assumption that a good borrower who tries to obtain
a loan and fails receives zero is equivalent to a speci-
fication where the up-front cost equals Rautarky and the
output with liquidity (before the up front cost is paid)
equals R + Rautarky.
Lenders have one unit of liquidity, which they
can use in two mutually exclusive ways. First, they
can invest it at a gross risk-free rate Rf. Second, they
can attempt to find a borrower to whom to lend. If a
borrower and a lender match, the loan contract takes
the following exogenous specification:23 If R is pro-
duced, the lender receives Rlend (where Rlend is an
exogenous parameter satisfying Rlend ³ Rsalvage) and
the borrower receives Rborr º R  Rlend; if Rsalvage is pro-
duced, the borrower is in default, so the lender re-
ceives the full salvage value Rsalvage and the borrower
receives nothing. Finally, if a lender does not find a
borrower, she simply ends up with her unit of liquidi-
ty.24 To summarize, the payoffs are as follows:
1) Payoff to good borrower =
Rborr if borrower matches with lender
0 if borrower attempts to match with
lender and fails
Rautarky if borrower operates project autarkically.
2) Payoff to bad borrower =
Rborr if borrower matches with lender and
project produces R9 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
0 if borrower attempts to match with
lender and fails or if borrower matches
with lender and project produces Rsalvage
or if borrower operates project autarkically.
3) Payoff to lender =
Rlend if lender matches with borrower and
project produces R
Rsalvage if lender matches with borrower and
project produces Rsalvage
1 if lender attempts to match with a
borrower and fails
Rf if lender uses the risk-free investment
and does not attempt to match with a
borrower.
The matching procedure
According to equations 1, 2, and 3, the expected
payoff to an agent who attempts to match depends on
the probability of consummating the match. Suppose
that there are a total of B borrowers seeking loans and
L lenders seeking to match with borrowers. I denote
the probability that a given borrower matches with a
lender by probborr (B,L). Similarly, the probability that
a given lender matches with a borrower is denoted
problend(B,L). (In equilibrium, the expected number of
matches equals B ´ probborr(B,L) = L ´ problend(B,L).)
If either B or L equals zero, both probborr and
problend = 0. (That is, if there are no borrowers or
lenders, there can be no matches.) It is also natural to
assume, in the language of Mortensen and Pissarides
(1998), that borrowers and lenders are complements.
That is, it is easier for a borrower to find a match if
there are more lenders, and vice versa. (Formally,
0 and 0.





) In addition, follow-
ing Mortensen and Pissarides (1998), I assume that
there is a congestion effect. An increase in the number
of borrowers decreases the probability that a given
borrower will match, and vice versa. (Formally,
0 and 0.






Finally, I assume that the expected number of
matches displays increasing returns to scale. This is
equivalent to the condition that as the number of bor-
rowers and lenders increases equiproportionally, both
problend and probborr increase. This is a natural assump-
tion to make for many types of matching problems.
Consider the problem of finding a taxi cab in a medi-
um-sized city. If there were only one rider looking
for a cab and one cab looking for a fare (as might be
the case at 2:00 am), the probability of a match would
be very low. If there were 10,000 riders and 10,000
cabs, the probability that a given rider would find a
cab would be much higher. (This intuition is formal-
ized in the model developed in appendix A.)25
Increasing returns is implied by a number of
search models that have been proposed in the literature.
In appendix A, I discuss a number of these and I
develop one model in detail. Diamond (1982) and
others note that increasing returns in the matching
technology can give rise to multiple search equilibria.
I exploit this feature below.26
High-coordination and low-coordination equilibria
The matching technology implies that the deci-
sion of borrowers whether to enter the match affects
the probability that a given lender will match and,
therefore, affects the expected payoff to the lender
from entering the match. Similarly, the decisions of
lenders affect the expected payoff of the borrower.
This implies the possibility of coordination failure
between borrowers and lenders and, thus, the possibil-
ity of multiple equilibria. I define a high-coordination
equilibrium as one in which all lenders enter the match
and all borrowers enter the match. Of course, a lender
will enter the match if, and only if, her expected pay-
off from entering the match equals or exceeds Rf.
Using the payoffs given in equation 3, in a conjec-
tured high-coordination equilibrium this condition
can be written as
4) problend (Nborr, Nlend)((pbq + 1  pb) Rlend +
pb(1  q)Rsalvage) + (1  problend(Nborr, Nlend)) ³ Rf.
Similarly, a good borrower will enter the match,
if and only if, his expected payoff from entering the
match equals or exceeds Rautarky. In a conjectured high-
coordination equilibrium, this condition is
5) probborr(Nborr, Nlend)Rborr ³ Rautarky).
Note from equation 2 that the bad borrowers always
enter the match, since the payoff from entering the
match dominates the autarkic payoff to the bad borrow-
er of zero. Therefore, equations 4 and 5 are sufficient
for the existence of a high-coordination equilibrium.
I define a low-coordination equilibrium as one
where no lenders enter the match and only bad bor-
rowers enter the match. The payoff to lenders in the
low-coordination equilibrium is Rf. The payoff to
good borrowers is Rautarky, and the payoff to bad bor-
rowers is zero. If there are no lenders in the match,
there is clearly no incentive for good borrowers to
defect from the equilibrium strategy of autarky (since10 Economic Perspectives
probborr (1,0) = 0). However, there may be an alterna-
tive strategy for a lender that could break the low-
coordination equilibrium. Let the total number of bad
borrowers be denoted Nbad. (The expected value of
Nbad is simply pbNborr.) If, starting in a low-coordina-
tion equilibrium, a lender decides to defect from the
equilibrium strategy by entering the match, her prob-
ability of matching with a borrower is problend (Nbad, 1)
(since only bad borrowers are in the match in a low
equilibrium). Her expected payoff conditional on a
successful match is qRlend + (1  q) Rsalvage. Therefore,
a low-coordination equilibrium can only be sustained
if the expected payoff to this alternative strategy is
less than the payoff to a lender in the low-coordina-
tion equilibrium:
6) problend (Nbad, 1)(qRlend + (1  q)Rsalvage) +
(1  problend(Nbad, 1)) £ Rf.
The left-hand sides of equations 4 and 6 give the
value to a lender of entering the match in the high-
coordination and low-coordination equilibria, respec-
tively. Similarly, the left-hand side of equation 5 gives
the value to a good borrower of entering the match in
the high-coordination equilibrium. For a particular
base line parameterization,27 figure 4 displays how
these values are affected by changes in the model
parameters. Specifically, the left-hand column of
plots in figure 4 shows how the left-hand sides of
equations 4 (black lines) and 6 (colored lines) change
as a particular model parameter is varied; the right-
hand column does the same for the left-hand side of
equation 5 (colored lines). The five parameters that
are varied in figure 4 are: number of lenders, as a
fraction of total population (first row of plots); Rlend,
as a fraction of R (second row); Rsalvage, as a fraction
of R (third row); q (fourth row); and pb (fifth row).
The behavior of these values is intuitive. The val-
ue to lenders of entering the match for both equilibria
is strictly decreasing in the ratio of lenders to total
population (reflecting the greater competition from
other lenders); the corresponding value to good bor-
rowers is strictly increasing in this ratio (reflecting
the higher probability of matching with a lender). Not
surprisingly, increasing Rlend/R, the fraction of output
received by lenders, increases the value of the match
to lenders, but decreases that value to borrowers. For
both equilibria, the value of the match is increasing
for lenders in Rsalvage and q (the probability that a bad
project produces R). Neither of these parameters affects
the value of the match for good borrowers. Finally,
an increase in pb, the probability of bad projects,
reduces the value of the match for lenders in the
high-coordination equilibrium, but increases the value
of the match for lenders in the low-coordination equi-
librium. In the high-coordination equilibrium, increas-
ing pb simply increases the probability of borrower
default. In the low-coordination equilibrium, however,
an increase in pb increases the number of borrowers
seeking loans. (Recall that only bad borrowers seek
loans in the low-coordination equilibrium.) This in-
creases the probability of a match for a lender contem-
plating deviating from the equilibrium strategy.
Suppose the borrower condition for a high-coor-
dination equilibrium (equation 5) holds. That is, sup-
pose Rautarky lies below the colored line in any of the
plots in the right-hand column of figure 4. Then the
existence of the high- or low-coordination equilibrium
depends on the level of the risk-free rate Rf relative to
the solid and colored lines in the plots in the left-hand
column. If Rf is above both lines, then neither equi-
librium exists for these parameter values. If Rf is
below the solid line but above the colored line, then
both low-coordination and high-coordination equilib-
ria exist. If Rf is below both the solid line and the col-
ored line, then a high-coordination equilibrium exists
but no low-coordination equilibrium exists. Thus, if
equation 5 holds, the high-coordination equilibrium
can be enforced by setting Rf sufficiently low.
Finally, there may also be additional mixed
equilibria where a fraction of lenders and/or good
borrowers enter the match, while the remaining agents
choose the alternative strategies (investing risk-free
for lenders, operating the project autarkically for the
borrowers.) I discuss the conditions for these mixed
equilibria in box 1. The possibility of mixed equilib-
ria complicates the analysis of this model. For the
purposes of this article, I assume that these mixed
equilibria are never observed. For the remainder of
this section, I focus only on the low- and high-coordi-
nation equilibria.
Interpreting the model as a theory of
financial crises
I associate the low-coordination equilibrium in
the model with a financial crisis. This equilibrium
captures many characteristics associated with financial
crises. In this simple model, asset values and output
can both be measured by the expected payoff to a
borrowers project; both are clearly lower in the low-
coordination equilibrium than in the high-coordination
equilibrium.28 There is a clear flight to quality in the
low-coordination equilibrium, coupled with a drying-up
of liquidity: Lenders invest in the risk-free asset in-
stead of making loans, so the aggregate quantity of
liquidity provided falls to zero. There is a perception
of declining credit quality: If we were to ask a lender11 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
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Notes: For a particular set of baseline parameters, this figure illustrates how the value of entering the match implied by the model changes as
five parameters of the model are varied. The left-hand column of figures plots the value of a lender entering the match in the high-coordination
equilibrium (left-hand side of equation 4, represented by the black lines) and the low-coordination equilibrium (left-hand side of equation 6,
represented by the colored lines) changes as the following five parameters change: number of lenders, as fraction of total population (first
subplot); payoff to the lender Rlend, as a fraction of total output (second subplot); salvage value of a bad borrower’s project Rsalvage, as a fraction
of total output (third subplot); probability that a bad project is productive q, (fourth subplot); and the probability that a given project is bad, pb
(fifth subplot). The right-hand column of figures plots the value of a good borrower entering the match in the high-coordination equilibrium (left-
hand side of equation 5), as the same five parameters are varied. The baseline parameters are as follows: Nlend = 20; Nborr = 30; R = 2; Rlend = 1.2
(so Rborr = 0.8); Rsalvage = 0.5; pb = 0.2; q = 0.75. Parameter Nbad is set equal to its expected value of 6. I use the model of problend and probborr
described in appendix A, equations 19 and 20, with parameter M = 10.12 Economic Perspectives
BOX 1
Mixed equilibria
In a mixed equilibrium, some lenders and/or good
borrowers enter the match, while the remaining
agents choose the alternative strategies (investing
risk-free for lenders, operating the project autarki-
cally for the borrowers). If there were a continuum
of agents, these mixed equilibria would require
agents to be indifferent between entering the match
and using the alternative strategies. If one takes se-
riously the constraint that the number of agents of
each type be an integer, then the conditions for a
mixed equilibrium must take into account the effect
on the matching probabilities were an agent to devi-
ate from the equilibrium.
To write down the conditions for a mixed equi-
librium, it is convenient to define functions Vlend
and Vborr that measure the value of entering the
match for lenders and borrowers, respectively. Let
Bgood denote the number of good borrowers entering
the match, and let L denote the number of lenders
entering the match. Recall that all bad borrowers
enter the match (since the value of autarky for bad
borrowers is zero). Therefore, the fraction of bad
borrowers in the match is 
Nbad
N+ B bad good
, and
(analogously with the left-hand side of equation 4)
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The value of entering the match for a good borrow-
er is given by the analogue to the left-hand side of
equation 5:
B2) Vborr(Bgood, L) º probborr(Nbad + Bgood, L)Rborr.
If there were a continuum of agents, so the de-
fection of a single agent from the equilibrium strat-
egy would not affect the matching probabilities,
then a mixed equilibrium would be a pair {Bgood, L}
satisfying
B3) 0 < Bgood < Nborr  Nbad
0 < L < Nlend
for which
B4) Vlend (Bgood, L) = Rf
Vborr (Bgood, L) = Rautarky.
If (as I assume throughout this article) there are
an integer number of agents of each type, then a
conjectured defection from the equilibrium strategy
changes problend or probborr and, therefore, changes
Vlend or Vborr. To take this explicitly into consideration,
I must modify equation B4. Assume that
B5) Vlend is decreasing in L.
Since problend (B,L) is strictly decreasing in L,





















In other words, the expected payoff to a lender from a
successful match exceeds the payoff from entering the
match but failing to match. Note that Vborr is decreas-
ing in Bgood, because probborr (B,L) is strictly decreas-
ing in B. Under assumption B5, a mixed equilibrium
is a pair {Bgood, L} satisfying equation B3 and
B7) Vlend (Bgood , L + 1) £ Rf £ Vlend (Bgood, L)
Vborr (Bgood + 1, L) £ Rautarky £ Vborr (Bgood + 1,L).
The logic behind equation B7 is straightfor-
ward. If the first set of inequalities in equation B7
holds, then a lender in the match has no incentive to
switch to the risk-free asset (since the value of be-
ing in the match exceeds Rf), and a lender investing
risk-free has no incentive to switch to entering the
match (since, by entering the match, the total num-
ber of lenders in the match will equal L + 1, and the
value to being a lender in the match when the total
number of lenders equals L + 1 is dominated by the
risk-free rate). A similar logic holds for borrowers if
the second set of inequalities in equation B7 holds.
why she refrained from making loans, she would
answer that the risk of default was too high (since
all borrowers actually entering the match in the
low-coordination equilibrium are bad borrowers). This
is the sort of response given by lending institutions
in the BIS interviews and the Board of Governors13 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Senior Loan Officers Survey, discussed earlier. It is
also consistent with widening credit spreads. Further-
more, there is a reduction in demand for liquidity on
the part of borrowers, a pattern that was also reported
in the September Senior Loan Officers Survey.
This model is also consistent with sudden switches
between normal and crisis states without any change
in underlying fundamentals (as represented by the
models parameters). While I do not model dynamics
explicitly, a multiple-equilibrium model of this type
can be incorporated into a dynamic model in which
switches between coordination states are driven sole-
ly by changing expectations. If enough lenders in the
economy become pessimistic about the aggregate
number of borrowers entering the match (or vice versa),
then a low-coordination equilibrium will emerge,
validating their pessimism ex post. Thus, all that would
be needed to model the abrupt switches between crisis
and non-crisis states would be to model switching
between optimism and pessimism in the economy.29
Financial crises and the role
of the central bank
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the model
presented here is that it suggests a role for the central
bank in dealing with financial crises. We can see from
equation 6 that a liquidity crisis (that is, a low-coor-
dination equilibrium) is only possible if the real risk-
free rate is sufficiently high. If the central bank can
affect the real risk-free rate through open market
operations, it can extinguish the possibility of a liquid-
ity crisis by reducing the risk-free rate until the left-
hand side of equation 6 exceeds the right-hand side.
Intuitively, if the risk-free rate is so low that a lender
expects a higher return by seeking to match with a
borrower even if all borrowers are believed to be of
bad quality, then the low-coordination equilibrium
cannot be sustained.
Example of central bank action:
The events of 199193
One interpretation of monetary policy in the early
1990s is that the Federal Reserve used open market
operations in the manner suggested in the preceding
paragraph. The recovery from the 199091 recession
appeared to be impeded by a so-called credit crunch.
Responding perhaps to the introduction of risk-based
capital requirements, banks reduced their volume of
loan provision, investing instead in Treasury securi-
ties and other low-risk assets. One can see this process
in figure 5, panel A, which displays fixed income
securities as a fraction of total banking assets. Note
that fixed income securities as a percentage of total
assets rose from just over 15 percent at the beginning
of 1990 to over 20 percent at the beginning of 1993.
While this is far less dramatic than the complete coor-
dination failure in the low-coordination equilibrium of
the model, this process can be interpreted as a slow
shift away from full coordination.
In mid-1991, the FOMC started reducing the fed-
eral funds rate in an effort to encourage more lending.
This policy shift is evident in figure 5, panel B, which
displays the real federal funds rate (defined here as
the difference between the nominal federal funds rate
and the ex post monthly CPI inflation rate) from 1989
through 1997. Note that the real funds rate declines
to an extremely low level (between 0.5 percent and
0 percent) between late 1992 and February 1994. As
in the simple model, the effect is to reduce the return
on alternative assets, making even the relatively low
risk-adjusted return on loans seem reasonably attrac-
tive.30 As shown in figure 5, panel A, banks did shift
FIGURE 5
Bank portfolios and monetary policy, 198997.
A. Fixed income securities as fraction
of total assets, 1989:Q1–97:Q1
fraction of assets, quarterly
B. Real federal funds rate, 10/89–3/97
percent
1990 ‘91 ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96
Total fixed debt
>5 year
1–5 year 3–12 month <3 month
10/1/90 10/1/92 10/1/94 10/1/96
Notes: Panel A displays fixed income securities as a faction of
total bank assets. The uppermost black line displays total fixed
income securities. The other lines in the graph disaggregate the
securities by maturity. Panel B displays the real federal funds rate,
computed as the nominal federal funds rate minus the one-month
CPI inflation rate.
Sources: Call reports (panel A); author’s calculations, using data












away from non-loan assets to loans following the
implementation of this policy. It is possible that the
increased loan growth was due to some change in the
economic or regulatory environment other than the
extremely low real interest rates. However, these pat-
terns in the data are certainly consistent with the intu-
ition that lenders are more willing to lend when the
return to alternative investments is low, and that the
central bank can influence this alternative return.
Particularly interesting is what happened after
the FOMC reversed course starting in February 1994
and allowed the real interest rate to return to its level
of early 1990. If banks willingness to lend depended
only on the return on alternative assets, the banks
presumably would then have cut back on their loan
provision. In fact, figure 5, panel A shows that banks
continued to increase their lending. This suggests that
there may have been an element of coordination failure
in the credit crunch. Once the economy had securely
moved to a high-coordination state, it could remain
there even after the FOMC raised real interest rates
to a higher level.
Policy alternatives implied by the model
According to the model, a central bank can prevent
financial crises by keeping interest rates extremely
low all the time. However, this strategy conflicts with
the central focus of monetary policy: to establish a
reputation as a force for price stability. Even if the Fed
could act against the possibility of a low-coordination
equilibrium by decisively reducing Treasury yields,
such an action would be costly, not only in its direct
effect on future inflation, but also in eroding the credi-
bility of the Feds commitment to containing infla-
tionary pressures.
In principle, a central bank could reconcile these
two competing imperatives by establishing a credible
state-dependent policyenforce a low interest rate
only when there is clear evidence that a financial
crisis is imminent. The advantage of such a policy is
that the low interest rate is rarely implemented, yet
the possibility that it might be implemented moves
the economy to a preferred equilibrium. In fact, when
I incorporate such a state-dependent policy into the
simple model developed earlier, the low interest rate
is never implemented. In the language of economic
theory, it is an off-equilibrium path that enforces the
high-coordination equilibrium.
As an example of such a state-dependent policy,
consider the aftermath of the October 1987 stock
market crash. There is considerable anecdotal evi-
dence that many banks were reluctant to provide the
liquidity needed to settle trades made during the day
of the crash. This withdrawal of liquidity may have
represented a low-coordination equilibrium: If a given
bank is likely to be repaid only if the aggregate pro-
vision of liquidity is high, it may be individually
rational for each bank to withhold liquidity. In response,
the Federal Reserve announced a state-contingent
policy: The Federal Reserve ... affirmed today its
readiness to serve as a source of liquidity to support
the economic and financial system.31 The operative
word is readiness. With the Fed standing ready to
ensure adequate liquidity in the market, it became
rational for individual banks to provide liquidity to
their clients. In the event, no significant liquidity
disruptions were observed,32 yet the Fed itself did
not actively provide the liquiditydiscount window
borrowing by member banks did not increase signifi-
cantly, and the increase in non-borrowed reserves
was small.
In September 1998, investors were uncertain
whether a state-dependent policy was in place.33 One
can interpret the intermeeting rate cut on October 15,
1998, as a credible signal that the Fed had shifted to this
sort of state-dependent policy. It seems more plausible
to interpret the effect of this rate cut to its role as a sig-
nal than to any direct effects. Certainly, the interest rate
cuts in fall of 1998 were much smaller than those in
199091, clearly not sufficient to substantially change
investors incentives directly. There is evidence that
financial markets perceived the intermeeting rate cut
as signaling a policy change. According to the Wall
Street Journal, the economic indicators that the Fed
usually tracksthe unemployment rate, the pace of
orders for factory goods and retail sales, among other
thingsdont explain the Feds sudden action, since
many of those indicators have suggested that the
economy is relatively healthy. Rather, officials at the
Fed ... have been focused on unusual signs of stress
in the financial markets.34 In the words of analysts
at Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, the Feds unexpected
easing signaled a new aggressiveness.35 Market
participants perception of a change in Fed emphasis
is consistent with the minutes of the FOMCs delib-
erations. In the minutes of the September 29 meeting,36
the financial market turmoil is noted, but it is seen
primarily as one factor among many affecting inflation-
ary pressures through aggregate demand. In particular,
The members did not believe that the tightness in
credit markets and strong demand for safety and liquidi-
ty were likely to lead to a credit crunch. ... A 50
basis-point cut is explicitly ruled out because the
risk of rising inflation ... was still present, especially
in light of the persistence to date of very tight labor
markets and relatively robust economic growth. In
contrast, the minutes of the FOMC teleconference
preceding the intermeeting rate cut of October 15 do15 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
not mention inflationary pressures at all. Rather, an
additional rate cut is motivated to help settle volatile
financial markets and cushion the effects of more
restrictive financial conditions on the ongoing expan-
sion. Following the October 15 action, members of
the FOMC describe the move as a (temporary) shift of
focus from price stability to financial stability. For ex-
ample, the Wall Street Journal cited Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis President William Poole as saying
that [the recent market instability] and the circum-
stances surrounding it are so unusual in the context
of U.S. history that policy makers must concentrate
on dealing with this situation for the time being.37
According to the same article, Governor Roger Fer-
guson indicated that the Fed would be willing to cut
rates aggressively at any hint of a recession.
In the following section, I incorporate such a
state-dependent policy into the simple model out-
lined earlier. I argue that such a policy, if credible,
may have been sufficient to eliminate the possibility
of coordination failure without requiring the central
bank to actually implement any substantial interest
rate reductions. To formalize this idea, I extend the
model so that the central bank acts in real time. I then
demonstrate that the low-coordination equilibrium can
be eliminated if agents believe that the monetary au-
thority will act in the future to eliminate coordination
failure should coordination failure become likely.
Modeling a state-dependent central bank policy
To model a central bank interest rate policy that
actively responds to a developing liquidity crisis, I
need to modify the simple model to make precise the
notion of incipient crisis. I do so in the following
(admittedly highly stylized) way. Suppose that there
is a preliminary period before the matching of bor-
rowers and lenders. At the beginning of this prelimi-
nary period, each lender is assigned at random a mood
of pessimism or optimism. A pessimist believes that
the low-coordination equilibrium will prevail provided
a low-coordination equilibrium could exist (that is,
provided equation 6 could hold). An optimist believes
that the high-coordination equilibrium will prevail,
again provided this equilibrium could exist (that is,
equations 4 and 5 could hold). In addition, in the be-
ginning of the preliminary period the Nlend lenders are
assigned an index i = 1, ..., Nlend. They then must declare
(irrevocably) in order of their index assignment whether
they will enter the match or invest in the risk-free tech-
nology. After all Nlend lenders have declared, the match
is held, projects are operated, and payoffs are made,
as in the simple model.
Let Qi denote the number of lenders who have
declared that they are in the match through the ith
lender, so QNlend denotes the total number of lenders
committed to entering the match at the end of the
preliminary period. As I show in proposition 1 below,
if QNlend  is sufficiently high (that is, if QNlend is greater
than or equal to a particular threshold N*), a low-
coordination equilibrium cannot exist. A pessimist
with index i will assume that the low-coordination
equilibrium will prevail unless Qi1 (weakly) exceeds
this threshold.
Now, I develop this idea more fully. For simplic-
ity, I consider a case where the central bank can choose
one of two interest rates: Rhigh and Rlow, where Rhigh is
consistent with both equilibria. That is, when Rf = Rhigh,
equations 4, 5, and 6 all hold. (I discuss conditions on
Rlow below.) If Rf = Rhigh, the equilibrium that emerges
depends on the beliefs of the lenders about QNlend. In
particular, there exists an N* such that, if it is believed
that QNlend³ N*, it is optimal for all good borrowers
to enter the match. The smallest such value of N* is
given by
7) N* = min N s.t. probborr (Nborr, N) Rborr ³ Rautarky.
The existence of N* £ Nlend follows from the as-
sumption that a high-coordination equilibrium exists
(that is, equation 5 holds.)
To proceed, I must make an additional assump-
tion. Let Vlend denote the value to a lender of entering
the match. Vlend depends on both the total number of
lenders in the match and the number of good borrowers
in the match. An explicit expression for Vlend is given
in equation B1 in box 1. I assume that
8) Vlend is strictly decreasing in the total number of
lenders in the match.
A sufficient condition for assumption 8 to hold is
given in equation B6 in box 1.
Proposition 1
Suppose equations 4 and 8 hold. If all lenders be-
lieve that QNlend will be at least as big as N*, then all lenders
enter the match, so QNlend= Nlend ³ N*. This implies, first,
that their beliefs are ratified ex post, and, second, that
the high-coordination equilibrium prevails. (The proofs
of all propositions are in appendix B.)
Proposition 1 tells us that the central bank can
ensure that the high-coordination equilibrium will
prevail if it can ensure that at least N * lenders com-
mit to entering the match. As in the previous model,
it can do so by setting Rf sufficiently low. To formal-
ize this possibility, let us assume that
9) (qRlend + (1  q) Rsalvage) > 116 Economic Perspectives
and let Rlow satisfy
10) problend (Nbad,N*) (qRlend + (1  q) Rsalvage)
+ (1  problend (Nbad, N*)) ³ Rlow.
Equation 9 means that the expected payoff to a
lender conditional on matching with a bad borrower
exceeds the payoff from failing to match. It ensures
that the left-hand side of equation 10 is increasing
in problend.
Proposition 2
If the central bank sets Rf = Rlow and equations 9
and 10 hold, the high-coordination equilibrium is
enforced.
Proposition 2 tells us that the central bank can
eliminate the low-coordination equilibrium by perma-
nently setting the risk-free rate sufficiently low (in
particular, low enough so equation 10 holds). In real-
ity, however, this low interest rate policy is a very
costly way to deal with the possibility of financial
crisis. As I discussed above, the excessively expan-
sionary monetary policy needed to keep interest rates
at Rlow may directly conflict with the central banks pri-
mary mission of price stability. If so, a better central
bank rule is to set Rf = Rhigh, but commit to switching to
Rlow if there is evidence of an incipient crisis. Infor-
mally, the central bank can measure the tone of the
market by looking at the ratio Qi/i. This ratio gives
the fraction of the first i lenders who will enter the
match, so this ratio measures the skittishness of the
market. If the central bank observes a low value of
Qi/i (presumably because the random assignment of
the first i indexes fell disproportionately on pessimists),
it may be concerned that a financial crisis is brewing.
In the formalism of this model, let incipient
crisis be defined as any point i* in the declaration
sequence such that
11) Qi* + (Nlend  i*) = N*.
In words, if such an i* is reached, then all of the
remaining lenders must declare themselves in the
match to ensure that there are N* lenders seeking to
match with borrowers. Since the goal of the central
bank is to ensure that at least N* lenders enter the
match, this is the last chance for the central bank
to do so.
Central bank rule
The proposed central bank rule is as follows:
n Set Rf = Rhigh as long as no {i*, Qi*} satisfying
equation 11 is reached.
n The first time {i*, Qi*} satisfying equation 11 is
reached, set Rf = Rlow from that point on.
Proposition 3
If this rule is credible, the only equilibrium is
high-coordination with Qi = i, i, and Rf = Rhigh.
According to proposition 3, the second branch
of the rule is an off-equilibrium path that is never
observed in equilibrium. Thus, the best of all possible
worlds is obtained: Liquidity crises are ruled out
without compromising the goal of price stability.
Proposition 3 specifies that the rule must be credible.
I do not attempt to formalize how credibility is to
be established. Authors such as Christiano, Chari, and
Eichenbaum (1998) and Christiano and Gust (2000)
stress the importance of the central bank establishing
a credible commitment to price stability if expecta-
tions-driven inflationary episodes are to be avoided.
Proposition 3 suggests that a credible commitment
to financial stability may serve an analogous role in
avoiding financial crises.
Discussion
Is this what happened in October 1998?
One interpretation of the FOMCs interest rate
cut on October 15, 1998, is that it was an intentional
signal that Federal Reserve had shifted from an un-
equivocal focus on price stability to a policy of price
stability unless there is a pressing need to deter a finan-
cial crisis. In the formalism of the model, the former
policy sets Rf = Rhigh always, while the latter policy is
given by the policy rule described above.
There are clearly other possible explanations for
the ending of the fall 1998 crisis. One such explana-
tion is that the reduced interest rates increased the
collateral value of firms fixed income portfolios,
thereby increasing their borrowing capacity. But the
effect of a 50 basis-point interest rate cut on the value
of debt holdings is small, especially for the short-term
securities generally used as collateral. In any event,
the turmoil in fall of 1998 was associated with a flight
to quality, which raised the value of the Treasury secu-
rities that typically collateralize liquidity loans. An-
other explanation is that the open market operations
used to implement these interest rate cuts increased
the total supply of reserves in the system, increasing
the amount of liquidity available to be borrowed.
Again, this explanation seems wanting. In contrast
to the period from 1991 to 1993, when there was an
extended and pronounced increase in the volume of
reserves in circulation, the amount of reserves in fall
1998 was relatively unchanged.
Perhaps a more straightforward explanation for
the abrupt reversal of the 1998 crisis is that financial17 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
intermediaries believed that the Federal Reserve had
implicitly agreed to provide all financial institutions
with a guarantee. In particular, the role of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York in the recapitalization of
LTCM may have been interpreted as a commitment
to provide similar services to other intermediaries
with similar problems. I do not believe that the facts
support this explanation. Following the announcement
of the LTCM rescue plan, the crisis actually deepened.
Measures of credit spreads and market volatility de-
teriorated during the two weeks between the LTCM
rescue and the Federal Reserves intermeeting action
on October 15. Furthermore, market participants re-
ported that the Federal Reserves role in the rescue
served to exacerbate market fears, not ameliorate them.
Thus, the data seem to contradict the hypothesis that
the LTCM rescue was interpreted as an extension of
the safety net.
Finally, the October 15 rate cut may have signaled
a changed policy stance regarding International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) funding rather than monetary policy.
The Russian fiscal crisis virtually assured that a good
deal of IMF resources would flow to Russia. Without
an increase in funding levels, the IMFs resources to
deal with other countries problems (most important-
ly, Latin America) would have been substantially re-
duced. The increase in Brady bond yields, documented
in figure 3, may have reflected concerns that less IMF
funding would be available to deal with future Latin
American problems following the Russian crisis.
During 1998 the U.S. Congress was considering an
increase in Americas IMF funding quota. However,
there was considerable congressional opposition to
increased funding. Perhaps the October 15 rate cut
was interpreted as a signal that the Federal Reserve
would work with greater intensity to secure increased
IMF funding.
This interpretation is certainly possible. Howev-
er, it relies on a less direct mechanism than the mon-
etary policy interpretation I put forth in this article. It
places a good deal of weight on the Federal Reserves
influence with Congress. Furthermore, the Federal
Reserve was already on record supporting the propos-
al to increase IMF funding (see Chairman Greenspans
testimony to Congress on May 21, 1998), so the Oc-
tober 15 rate cut would have represented at best a
strengthening of this position, not a reversal of a pre-
viously held position. Finally, the data are not entirely
consistent with this explanation. As shown in figure
3, the peak in Latin American Brady bond yields during
1998 happened in mid-August (Mexico) or mid-Sep-
tember (Brazil and Argentina), not in mid-October
when the presumed signal occurred.
Costs of a state-contingent policy for financial crises
In the theoretical model described here, the state-
contingent policy rule is costless to implement, since
the low interest rate is never actually imposed in equi-
librium. Of course, the real world is not so simple. In
reality, there would doubtless be crises that could not
be extinguished by the belief that the central banks
rule specifies a particular off-equilibrium path. As a
practical matter, this sort of policy rule would require
aggressive monetary expansion from time to time.
Actions of this type have costs. Each time such a
monetary expansion is implemented, the central bank
compromises its primary objective of price stability.
Any time it injects liquidity into financial markets in
an effort to counter potential liquidity it faces the dif-
ficult task of negotiating a soft landingremoving
the liquidity after the crisis has abated without trig-
gering a recession. Furthermore, if the state-contingent
policy rule weakens the commitment to price stability,
the resulting instability might even increase the possi-
bility of financial crises. Finally, if private market
participants believe that the central bank will always
act to successfully counter financial turmoil, they may
engage in less vigilant risk management than they
would otherwise. This so-called moral hazard problem
may actually increase the chances of an incipient cri-
sis. Policymakers must take all of these issues into
consideration before adopting a state-contingent rule
as a practical policy doctrine.
Conclusion
In this article, I propose a precise characterization
of financial crisis. I argue that coordination problems
arise generically in financial markets. I associate finan-
cial crisis with a condition of coordination failure, in
which low levels of financial intermediation become
self-justifying. I also argue that the central bank, through
its ability to affect real interest rates, may be able to
extinguish the low-coordination trap. This argument
supports a role for the central bank in countering sys-
temic financial disruptions.
Having said this, there may be circumstances in
which the central banks power to affect real rates is
insufficient to stave off a crisis. In particular, if poten-
tial lenders are sufficiently pessimistic about returns
from lending, crisis aversion may require a real inter-
est rate below that achievable by open market opera-
tions. In addition, the use of open market operations
to counter financial crises is not without cost. Open
market operations can only have a temporary effect
on real rates. Prolonged use of this tool to reduce real
interest rates would run directly counter to the central
banks primary goal of price stability. In principle,18 Economic Perspectives
the central bank is better off establishing a credible
contingent policy, whereby a liquidity injection is only
made when there is evidence that a crisis is forth-
coming. In the simple model presented here, a credible
policy of this type never has to be implemented in
equilibrium. In reality, of course, life is not so sim-
ple. There would doubtless be cases where the cen-
tral bank would have to implement an expansionary
APPENDIX A
Increasing returns to scale in matching
Increasing returns to scale in matching can be de-
rived from a number of more primitive search models.
For example, Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) de-
scribe an environment in which each lender has a list
of telephone numbers that includes the numbers of
potential borrowers, and each borrower has a similar
list that includes the numbers of potential lenders. If
borrowers and lenders choose numbers at random,
the probability of a match displays increasing returns.
Kultti (1998) describes a somewhat more elaborate
model.1 In his approach, lenders are posted at fixed
locations, and borrowers randomly choose a location.
If there is a lender at the location and there are no
other borrowers, a match is made with certainty. If
there is a lender and more than one borrower at the
location, a borrower is chosen at random to match
with the lender. Finally, if there is no lender at the lo-
cation, no match is made. One can think of these lo-
cations as bank branches, where some branches have
exhausted their loan capacity. Kultti (1998) shows
that if the number of locations does not change as the
number of borrowers and lenders increases, the
matching probabilities display increasing returns.2
Now, I consider in greater detail a micro model
of matching, similar to Kulttis (1998), that implies
increasing returns. Suppose there are M locations. To
successfully match, a lender and a borrower must go
to the same location. They cannot communicate be-
fore traveling to a location, so the event of a lender
and a borrower being in the same location is purely
random. Ex ante, all locations look the same to both
lenders and borrowers. I assume that lenders and bor-
rowers make their location decision at random, inde-
pendently of the other lenders and borrowers.
Therefore, the probability that a given borrower or a
given lender arrives at any particular location is 1/M.3
An interpretation of this set-up is that the loca-
tions are banks or other intermediaries. Lenders are
agents with excess liquidity. To match with borrowers,
the lenders must go through an intermediary. Lenders
choose the intermediary at random. Similarly, borrow-
ers visit intermediaries at random to apply for a loan.
The loan application process is sufficiently time-inten-
sive that a borrower can only apply at one intermediary.
Suppose there are l lenders and b borrowers at a
given location. If l = 0 or b = 0, no matches take place
at that location. If l = b, all the lenders and borrowers
at that location match with probability one. If l > b,
the b borrowers are allocated randomly among the
lenders, so the probability of a given lender obtaining
a match is b/l, and all borrowers obtain a match with
probability one. Similarly if b > l, the probability of a
given borrower obtaining a match is l/b, and all lenders
obtain a match with probability one. To summarize,
{, } m i n , 1 ;
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I now compute the unconditional probability that
a lender will match. Let B denote the number of bor-
rowers seeking loans, and let L denote the number of
lenders seeking to match with borrowers. The proba-
bility that a given lender will be at a particular loca-
tion is 1/M. For n = 0, 1, ..., L, the probability that n
lenders will arrive at a particular location is denoted
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Similarly, for n = 0, 1, ..., B, the probability that n
borrowers will arrive at a particular location is
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monetary policy to counter an incipient crisis. Thus,
this articles policy implications have benefits and
costs that must be carefully weighed by policymakers
when considering practical policy formulation. None-
theless, this article does provide a formal justification
for the central bank as an essential institution in deal-
ing with financial crises.19 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIGURE A1
Effect of matching probabilities of increase
in numbers of borrowers or lenders
probability of a match
probability of a match
probability of a match
number of borrowers and lenders
number of borrowers
number of lenders
Notes: The top panel gives the probability that a lender or
borrower matches as both the number of lenders and the
number of borrowers increase at the same rate. The middle
panel gives the probability that a borrower matches as the
number of borrowers increases (holding lenders fixed). The
bottom panel gives the probability that a borrower matches as
the number of lenders increases (holding borrowers fixed).
A. Probability of a match as number
of borrowers and lenders increase
B. Probability that borrower matches
as number of borrowers increases
C. Probability that borrower matches
as number of lenders increases
















To determine probborr(B,L), the probability that a
given borrower matches, one must sum overall possi-
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In the second summation, I sum only to B1 because
we are concerned with the number of other borrow-
ers that show up at the same location as the given
borrower. There are only B1 other borrowers. The
expression for problend (B, L), the probability that a
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The increasing returns property is illustrated in
the first panel of figure A1. As both L and B rise, the
probability of a match (given by equation 19 or 20)
increases. As illustrated in the last two panels of fig-
ure A1, equation A1 implies that the probability of a
given borrower matching is increasing in the number
of lenders, L, (holding B constant) and decreasing in
the number of borrowers B (holding L constant).
Similarly, the probability of a given lender matching
is increasing in B and decreasing in L.
1See also Hall (1999).
2More generally, this result holds if the number of locations in-
creases at a slower rate than the number of borrowers and lenders.
3This explicitly rules out equilibria of the form, All borrowers and




Let functions Vborr and Vlend be defined as in equations
B1 and B2 of box 1. Probborr (B, L) is increasing in L
and decreasing in B. Therefore, the condition
                                   QNlend ³ N*
and equation 7 imply that Vborr (Bgood, QNlend) ³ Rautarky
for all Bgood £ Nborr  Nbad. This implies that all good
borrowers enter the match. However, if all good bor-
rowers enter the match, then equations 4 and 8 imply
that the value of entering the match to a lender ex-
ceeds Rf, regardless of the decisions of the other
lenders.1 Therefore, all lenders enter the match.
This ends the proof.20 Economic Perspectives
NOTES
1An account of the events surrounding the Russian default can be
found in Perotti (2000).
2Immediately following the announcement of the rate cut, the
Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped. Press reports indicate that
many investors expected a bigger rate cut. The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce described the move as underwhelming in its modesty
(Schlesinger and Wessel, 1998b), and investors in bond futures
were treating a half-point cut by years end as a certainty, and a
half-point cut tomorrow as a reasonable possibility (Schlesinger,
1998). The federal funds futures market supports this assertion.
From September 25 through 28, the price of the October federal
funds futures contract implied an expected fed funds rate of
around 5.16 percent for the month of October (down from 5.5
percent before September 29). This implies that investors put
substantial probability on a cut of 50 basis points or more at the
September FOMC meeting.
3[M]arkets had been rife with rumors about the possibility of an
intermeeting move for the past week or so.  in Greenlaw (1999).
4The fed funds futures market gives a forecast of the 30-day aver-
age federal funds rate over the month of October. The funds rate
was already at 5.25 percent. A rate cut in mid-October to 5.00
percent would move the 30-day average of October rates to 5.125
percent. If investors only assigned a 50 percent probability to
such a rate cut, the expected average rate would be approximately
5.18 percent.
5The magnitudes of the declines were as follows: UK, 23 percent;
Germany, 19 percent; Japan, 18 percent; Canada, 28 percent; Italy,
32 percent; and France, 29 percent.
6I would like to thank Eileen Smith of the Chicago Board Options
Exchange for providing me with these data.
7The actual peak in the volatility index came on October 8, 1998,
the date of the trough in the S&P 500 index.
8The behavior of default spreads for other G-7 countries gives a
less clear picture of the start and end of the crisis. For Canada,
France, Italy, and the UK, these spreads move roughly in line
with the U.S. data (although the interbank spread for France is
so volatile that it is difficult to identify peaks and troughs with
any degree of certainty). The German interbank spread peaks in
November 1998, several weeks after the peak in U.S. data. Finally,
the behavior of default spreads in Japanese data is rather different
from the other G-7 countries. In particular, the Japanese interbank
spread shows little evidence of a liquidity crisis until a pronounced
spike in mid-November 1998, well after the crisis abated in the U.S.
9The Board of Governors Senior Loan Officers Survey can be
found on the Internet at www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
SnLoanSurvey/. The surveys in August and November 1998 fol-
lowed the Boards usual procedure of asking respondents about
credit conditions over the preceding three months. Therefore, the
November survey reflected most of the crisis period. In contrast,
the September 1998 survey was a special survey that only asked
about credit conditions over the previous month.
10This characterization of markets during the crisis is confirmed
by other sources. For example, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
reported a sharply reduced volume of activity across the corpo-
rate borrowing spectrum. (Roach, 1998.) Similarly, a strategist at
Merrill Lynch asserted that there were literally occasions when
you could not get a bid of any kind for debt that was a reasonable
risk (The Economist Newspaper Limited, 1998, p. 75).
11See Schlesinger and Wessel (1998a).
12BIS (1999, p. 42).
13The role of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in the recapi-
talization of LTCM was limited to providing meeting facilities for
the involved parties. The Federal Reserve provided no funds in
the LTCM workout.
14According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census (1998), the U.S. exports of goods and services to Argentina,
Mexico, and Brazil in 1997 exceeded $93 billion (13.5 percent of
total U.S. exports), while U.S. imports from these countries totaled
almost $98 billion (11.2 percent of U.S. total). In contrast, U.S.
exports to Russia totaled $3.4 billion (0.49 percent of the U.S.
total) with imports from Russia totaling $4.3 billion (0.50 percent
of the U.S. total).
Proposition 2
If Rf = Rlow, equations 9 and 10 together imply
that if Qi1 < N*, it is optimal for the ith lender to en-
ter the match, even if no good borrowers enter the
match. This follows because equation 9 ensures that,
for arbitrary N %,











is decreasing in  N %. (Recall that  (, ) lend bad prob N N % is
decreasing in  N %: As more lenders compete with a
given lender, the probability that a lender matches
goes down.) This in turn means that at least N* lend-
ers will enter the match, regardless of what any of
the other lenders or good borrowers do, so QNlend  ³ N*.
According to proposition 1, this is sufficient for the
high coordination equilibrium to prevail. This com-
pletes the proof.
Proposition 3
To prove proposition 3, note that the monetary
policy rule ensures that there will always be at least
N* lenders committing to enter the match. By prop-
osition 1, this is sufficient to ensure that the high-
coordination equilibrium prevails. This completes
the proof.
1This assertion uses the fact that assumption 8 implies that
Vlend (B,L) is decreasing in L. Therefore, if Vlend (Nborr  Nbad, Nlend)
³ R f, then Vlend (Nborr  Nbad, L) ³ R f, L £ Nlend.21 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
15Brady bonds are U.S. dollar-denominated obligations of various
developing countries, mainly in Latin America.
16For Indonesia and Malaysia, swap yields for maturities up to
two years and forward exchange rates for up to one year closely
track the spot exchange rates for these currencies. That is, these
forward-looking markets did not anticipate the currency devalua-
tions. Data on these particular markets are not available for Korea
and the Philippines, but yields on government bonds (five-year
maturity for Korea, one-year maturity for the Philippines) display
the same patterns as the Indonesian and Malaysian swap yields:
they did not budge until these countries devalued their currency.
The only country where interest rates (as measured by swap yields)
and forward exchange rates moved before the devaluation was
Thailand. For that country, both rates started to increase six weeks
before the devaluation of the baht. However, this coincided with
the initial speculative attacks on the baht and the Thai governments
initial attempts to defend its currency peg. See Halcomb and
Marshall (2001).
17See Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1998).
18In developing this model, I benefited from extensive discussions
with François Velde.
19These second and third characteristics were also associated with
the Asian crisis of 1997. The reduction in liquidity provision took
the form of a reversal of short-term capital flows from western
countries. Needless to say, stock markets fell precipitously in all
five Asian crisis countries.
20In this example, which is discussed in Cooper and John (1988),
there can be more than two equilibria.
21The classic demonstration of how a search model can give rise
to a thick markets externality is Diamond (1982).
22Id like to thank Eric French for suggesting this interpretation.
23It would be preferable to have the contract emerge as the equi-
librium outcome of a bargaining game. This approach is not straight-
forward to implement. The Nash (1953) axiomatic approach to
solving the two-person bargaining problem does not generalize
to a game with asymmetric information. An alternative would be
to specify a noncooperative bargaining game. For example, one
could assume that either the borrower or lender is randomly given
the right to make a single take-it-or-leave-it offer. (Mortensen
and Pissarides, 1998, note that this game under full information
implies the same solution as a particular version of the Nash bar-
gaining problem.) It is beyond the scope of this article to explore
the range of noncooperative game theoretic approaches to this
problem. As a result, I adopt the simple expedient of an exog-
enous contract.
24My assumption that a lender who fails to match gets a zero net
return captures the idea that there is some opportunity cost to
committing to provide loans, rather than investing exclusively in
the risk-free investment. However, the analysis would not be
changed substantially if a lender who fails to match received a
small positive return.
25Lagos (2000) develops a model of passengercab matching that
implies constant returns to scale. The difference between this
model and the model I develop in appendix A is that Lagos (2000)
assumes a continuum of passengers and cabs, whereas my model
assumes that both passengers and cabs are discrete and finite
in number.
26More recently, DenHaan, Ramey, and Watson (1999) and
Burdette, Imai, and Wright (2000) propose search models that
give rise to nontrivial multiple equilibria even with constant
returns to scale.
27The baseline parameters used in figure 4 are: Nlend = 20; Nborr = 30;
R = 2; Rlend = 1.2 (so Rborr = 0.8); Rsalvage = 0.5; pb = 0.2; q = 0.75.
Parameter Nbad is set equal to its expected value of 6. I use the
model of problend and probborr described in appendix A, equations
A2 and A1, with parameter M = 10.
28Of course, this static model cannot address the question of why
existing assets decline in value. If existing productive assets uti-
lize a continued flow of credit to maintain high profitability, a
reluctance of lenders to provide credit would presumably reduce
asset values. However, it would require a dynamic extension of
this model to analyze this effect formally.
29In the literature on financial fragility, this is typically done by
assuming an exogenous sunspot process, whose realization
determines the state of optimism in the economy. (See, for example,
Chang and Velasco 1998, Christiano and Harrison 1996, and
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2000.) I do not explicitly
implement this approach for rendering the model dynamic, but
to do so would be straightforward.
30While figure 5, panel B displays the real overnight interest rate,
the relevant rate for bank incentives is the expected rate of return
from holding longer-term fixed income securities. Forecasting
expected real holding period returns is a process fraught with
difficulty, and I do not attempt to do so here. However, simple
term structure models (such as the expectations hypothesis) imply
that expected real holding period returns move with short-term
real interest rates. Figure 5, panel B suggests that the expected
returns relevant to bank decisions fell substantially as a result of
the Federal Reserves expansionary policy from 1991 to 1993.
31Quoted in Murray (1987).
32For an account of these events, see the Securities Exchange
Commission report excerpted in Kamphuis et al. (1989).
33For example, the Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Global Economic
Forum of September 25, 1998, noted that a large rate cut at the
FOMC meeting four days later  may reflect a potentially
profound transformation in the Feds basic philosophy. The
forum argued  that the biggest risk of all is that the worlds
policymakers may not be up to the task at hand. Similarly, Jacob
Schlesinger wrote in the Wall Street Journal of September 28,
1998, that an easing of monetary policy would mark a swift and
amazing turnaround in the central banks fundamental economic
outlook. For well over a year, the Feds greatest concern has been
inflation, not recession.
34Schlesinger and Wessel (1998a), p. A3.
35Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (1999).
36Minutes of the FOMC can be obtained from the Federal Reserve
website at www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/minutes/.
37Schlesinger and Ip (1998).22 Economic Perspectives
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